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Abstract
Fund managers compete to attract new investors. Competition and fund management
contracts provide implicit and explicit incentives for fund management. I study the
combined eﬀect of these two types of incentives on i) investors’ search for talented fund
managers and on ii) talented fund managers’ use of private investment signals. I show
that an intermediate level of competition yields less eﬃcient use of private investment
signals and a lower average rate of return than in the case of either a high or a low level
of competition in the fund management industry. Furthermore, I show that although
explicit incentives improve managers’ use of private information, they may harm new
investors’ search for talented fund managers. Explicit incentives may improve current
performance, but cause prospective performance of the fund industry to deteriorate.
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1 Introduction
Mutual fund managers compete to attract potential investors. This market rivalry provides
implicit incentives for fund management. In addition, explicit incentives are provided by
contracts between fund managers and investors. I analyze how the combined eﬀect of these
two types of incentives influences fund managers’ choice of investment strategies and investors’
search for talented fund managers.
Implicit incentives exist because many investors believe that previous top-performers are
better fund managers than their rivals. Consequently, investors flock to previous winners.
In this paper, ”flocking to top performers” has a rational explanation. Investors who use
Bayes rule and past fund manager performance to update their beliefs about fund managers’
talents prefer to invest in the top performer. This tendency creates implicit incentives for
fund management. Walter (1999) notes that ”despite clear warnings that past performance
is no assurance of future results, a rise in the performance rankings often brings in a flood
of new investments and management-company revenues, with the individual asset manager
compensated commensurately”
Several empirical studies show that there are significant implicit incentives in the fund
management industry.1 More precisely, there is a strong positive relationship between realized
return and subsequent inflow of investments for the last years’ top performers but a weak and
insignificant relationship for the others. For instance, Sirri and Tufano (1998) report that ”for
funds in the bottom 80th percentile, there is a positive but relatively shallow relationship
between realized return and subsequent flows, but no pronounced penalty for extremely
poor relative performance. However, there is a market bonus for high realized returns; the
performance-flow relationship is very strong for funds whose historic performances place them
in the top 20th percentile in the prior year.”2 Business Week, 28 June 1999, noted that ”from
January through April, six top performing companies — Janus, Vanguard, Fidelity, Alliance,
MFS, and Putnam — accounted for just about all the fund inflows... Most fund companies
had no inflows at all”. Consequently, the fund managers face a convex or option-like incentive
structure that makes risky investment opportunities attractive. I consider investors’ optimal
provision of explicit incentives, taking the implicit incentives into account.
In the model developed, I assume that some fund managers possess talents or skills that
can be used to identify a number of undervalued firms and this allows them to achieve a higher
return on the funds they invest than managers with less talent or skills. More precisely, a
fund manager has access to two investment opportunities: a) an investment opportunity in
which by using his talent the manager can obtain a private signal about the value of the asset
1Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Ippolito (1992), Goetzmann and Peles (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998)
have all shown that prior performance is decisive for the growth of a mutual fund.
2See also Ippolito (1992), Gruber (1996), and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) for evidence of this non-linearity.
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(informed trade) and b) an investment opportunity in which there is symmetric information
about the value of the assets (noise trade). As in Allen and Gorton (1993) and Dow and
Gorton (1997), an ineﬃciently high level of noise trade is due in my model to contracting
problems between investors and fund managers.3 Furthermore, I assume that a noise trade
is riskier than an informed trade (Allen and Gorton (1993)).4
I construct a model in which investors hire fund managers and there are diﬃculties in
writing incentive-compatible eﬃcient compensation contracts due to fund managers’ limited
liability. After fund management contracts have been signed, each fund manager evaluates
an investment opportunity and obtains a private signal about its rate of return. The fund
managers decide whether to make a noise trade (ignore the signal) or an informed trade (use
the signal). One of the key features in the model is that the quality of the signal depends
on the manager’s ability or talent. The information structure is as follows. Ex ante, all
parties start with common knowledge about the prior distribution of the feasible investment
opportunities and the manager’s talent.5 However, the signal provides new information about
the investment opportunities which gives rise to interim asymmetry of information between
investors and managers. Ex post, the fund managers’ rates of return are observed publicly
and the managers are paid according to their fund-management contracts. In a dynamic
fund management market with an inflow of new investments and investors searching for
highly talented managers, investors use the public data about past performance in updating
beliefs about managers’ talents and in determining which fund to invest in. Hence, when
making a current decision on investment, a fund manager is also concerned about its eﬀect
on his market reputation in the future. I focus on how concerns about reputation or implicit
incentives influence fund managers’ use of private investment signals.
Gompers and Lerner (1999) studied contracts used by 419 United States venture funds
and showed that the predictions from a learning model similar to the one used here are more
consistent with observed contracts than the predictions from a competing signalling model.
Managers appear not to signal their diﬀerent skills and talents by oﬀering diﬀerent contracts.
Instead, investors learn about the fund managers’ talent and skills slowly.6
I show that the level of competition — the number of rival fund managers — is decisive for
the strength of the implicit incentives and the fund managers’ choice of investment strategies.
3 In most of the existing literature the origin of noise trade is not explicitly modeled. Besides trading due to
contracting problems between investors and fund managers, noise trade may viewed as trading due to agents’
liquidity or hedging motives (Dimond and Verrecchia (1981), Ausubel (1990), and Biais and Hillion (1994))
or trading of irrational traders (Black (1986) and De Long et al. (1990)).
4 In my model, noise traders have incentives to make their investments risky.
5Ex ante, the talent distribution and the distribution over feasible investment opportunities are assumed
to be the same for all fund managers.
6Lakonishok et al. (1992) report that contracts are very similar across investors and fund managers. Sep-
arating fee structures are not utilized to screen managers of diﬀerent ability.
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Fiercer competition makes it more likely that a fund manager would need a relatively high
rate of return to become a top performer and thereby attract a large share of new investments.
Hence a more competitive fund management industry may induce fund managers to make
risky noise trades instead of safe informed trades which yield a higher expected rate of return.7
It follows that fund managers’ average performance may decline as the level of competition
increases.
This negative relationship between the expected rate of return and the level of competition
is non-monotone. If the market rivalry becomes suﬃciently fierce, a fund manager’s likelihood
of becoming a top-performer becomes small and the implicit incentives weaken. As the
implicit incentives weaken, fund managers become more responsive to explicit incentives
provided by the fund-management contract and, consequently, the share of managers making
informed trades increases.
In the latter part of this paper, I study investors’ search for talented fund managers. Cur-
rent investors provide explicit incentives in order to maximize the current net rate of return.
They do not take into account that explicit incentives may influence later investors’ search
for talented managers. Although explicit incentives improve the current rate of return by in-
ducing more managers to make informed trades, I show that explicit incentives may obscure
which managers are best suited for future fund management. Fund managers switching from
a noise trade to an informed trade decrease their probability of becoming a top performer
and, consequently, other fund managers’ probabilities of becoming a top performer increase.
I show that as a consequence less talented fund managers may improve their win probability
suﬃciently to cause selection eﬃciency to deteriorate. Hence, from a social eﬃciency point of
view, fixed-fee contracts, which are common in the fund management industry, might be more
eﬃcient than incentive contracts provided that new investors’ search for talented managers
is taken into account.8
Also Dow and Gorton (1997) show that contracting problems may lead to trading activities
not reflecting private information. In both their and my model, uninformed trading or noise
trading lowers the expected rate of return.9 In contrast to their study, I show how implicit
incentives may lead to noise trading and how the level of noise trading may depend on the level
of competition in the fund industry. I also extend the scope of their analysis by analyzing
7James and Isaac (2000) (theory and laboratory experiments) and Karceski (2000) (empirical paper) show
that implicit (tournament) incentives can lead to mispricing of financial assets in the absence of private
information. Here I show that implicit incentives can lead to ineﬃcient use of private information and hence
mispricing.
8Golec (1992) reports that only 6 percent (29 of 476) of his sample of fund managerial contracts contain a
performance-based fee component.
9Also Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985) assume that talented fund managers have access to more precise
information about an investment’s rate of return than less talented managers. Informed trades are low risk
trades.
3
the relationship between the level of noise trading and investors’ search for talented fund
managers.
Several empirical papers examine how fund managers respond to the flow-performance
relationship observed in the mutual fund market. Brown et al. (1996), Roston (1996), and
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) all show that implicit incentives have a significant eﬀect on
risk taking. In contrast to these papers, I investigate how implicit and explicit incentives
may interact and whether this interaction improves or hinders the search for talented fund
managers for future fund management.
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) address an important limitation in most of the literature on
incentives in fund management. Their empirical study shows that a complete discussion of
the incentives facing mutual funds must consider both the agency relationship between the
fund company and the fund investors and the agency relationship between the fund company
and fund management. This requires a model with two layers of agency problems. Instead of
developing such a model I have simply assumed that fund companies pass on the incentives
it faces to its fund managers.
Most of the previous work on the agency relationship between an investor and his invest-
ment manager has assumed a single-period relationship (e.g., Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer
(1985), Allen (1990), Stoughton (1993), and Golec (1992)). Dynamics of portfolio manage-
ment contracts have been examined by Heinkel and Stoughton (1994). These papers focus
on motivating managers to acquire information — not on the extent of use of private infor-
mation. Furthermore, they do not take into account that investment managers face implicit
incentives.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the model used to ana-
lyze competition among mutual funds. In Section 3, I show how the interaction of implicit
and explicit incentives determines the expected performance of mutual funds. In Section 4,
I investigate new investors’ search for talented fund managers for future fund management.
Section 5 discusses briefly empirical implications of the analysis and related empirical litera-
ture. Section 6 points out some implications for public policy. Section 7 concludes. All proofs
are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
The competition in the mutual fund industry is modeled as a three-stage game involving
investors’ optimal design of incentive contracts and fund managers’ competition for new
investors. For the sake of simplicity, both fund managers and investors are assumed to be
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risk neutral.10 Figure 1 presents a schematic diagram of the three-stage game.11
Stage 1
Incentive contracts are oﬀered to fund managers.
Stage 2
Fund managers obtain private investment signals (θ) and
make either informed trades (use θ) or noise trades (ignore θ).
Stage 3
Rates of return become publicly known and managers are paid
according to their contracts. New investors choose a
fund manager for future fund management.
Figure 1: Timing.
To keep the notation simple, let a fund manager with talent θ obtain a signal about an
investment opportunity yielding r = θ rate of return. Hence, a fund manager can obtain
a certain rate of return by using his private signal. Assume that θ is fixed and at stage 1
incompletely known to the fund managers and the investors. Moreover, the investors and
managers share prior beliefs about θ; this prior is given by distribution function F (θ). Let
f (θ) denote the corresponding density function. In order to make the model tractable in
cases with a large number of competing fund managers, assume that the talent distribution,
F (θ), is uniform on [0, 1].
Instead of applying his investment signal to fund management, a fund manager can choose
to make a noise trade (e.g. a random deviation from a given benchmark all fund managers
are measured against). A noise trade yields a rate of return given by the probability function
G (r) and the corresponding density function g (r). The fund managers’ outcomes from noise
trades are identical and independently distributed.12 Note that it is important that a noise
10 If we assumed that investors were risk adverse, the investors would be more severely harmed by managers’
excessive risk taking. Stronger explicit incentives would need to be provided to mitigate the consequences of
the implicit incentives. However, none of our main results and insights hinges on the assumption that investors
are risk neutral.
11Note that investors do not receive private information directly from fund managers but benefit through
an extra rate of return. Reasons for the indirect sale of information, i.e. portfolio management, instead of the
direct sale of information are discussed in e.g. Admati and Pfleiderer (1990).
12Correlated outcomes would reduce the expected outcome of the best noise traders and hence, ceteris
paribus, decrease the probability of one of the noise traders outperforming all the fund managers making
informed investments. Consequently, if the outcomes from noise trades are correlated, fund managers become
less inclined to choose noise trades. However, fund managers will still have ineﬃciently strong incentives to
choose a noise trade instead of an informed trade.
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trade yields a riskier outcome than an informed trade. For the sake of simplicity, let the
outcome from a noise trade, G(r), be uniform on [0, 1].
All investors have K capital each. At stage 1, investors oﬀer incentive contracts, w (r) ,
to fund managers. The contracts relate a fund manager’s payment to the rate of return he
has achieved. The fund managers are assumed to have limited liability, w (r) ≥ 0, and their
payment is required to be weakly increasing in rate of return achieved, w0 (r) ≥ 0. If there
were a region over which payment and performance were negatively correlated, then this
would generate perverse incentives for fund managers to sabotage the performance measure
in this region — e.g., inflate the trading costs by making an excessive number of transactions.
By assuming that w0 (r) ≥ 0 the analysis is simplified, but the main results do not depend
on this assumption. As we will see later, highly talented fund managers need weaker explicit
incentives to make an informed trade than low-talented managers. Hence, we could keep
the total incentives for making an informed trade constant by providing weaker ”contract”
incentives to highly talented fund managers. This approach would not change the main
qualitative results in the paper but it would make it less expensive for investors to provide
explicit incentives for low-talented fund managers.
In 1995, only 117 of the 6997 mutual funds in the Morningstar database employed incentive
fees. This fact serves as motivation for using commonly observed fixed fee contracts (in
which payment increases with the amount of funds under management and is independent of
performance) as a benchmark.
Each fund manager is assumed to take care of only one investor’s investments. Hence
the number of fund managers, n, is the same as the number of investors. For the sake of
simplicity, n is treated as a continuous variable. This enables us to ignore possible free-riding
and coordination problems among investors in their provision of incentives to fund managers.
Possible implications of relaxing this assumption are discussed below.
At stage 3, fund managers are paid according to their fund-management contracts and
their performance. New investors search for talented fund managers. Investors expect there
to be a positive correlation between the quality of the signals obtained in the past and the
quality of future signals (after stage 3). In my model, I show that the top performer is
expected to be the most talented and, consequently, the best choice for investors at stage
3 (Proposition 5). Hence, flocking to the top performer is the optimal strategy for new
investors.13 Instead of modelling fund management after stage 3, I simply assume that the
top performer’s inflow of new investments is worth S ·θ, where S is a positive constant. Hence,
13Hence, a fund manager that chooses the strategy that maximizes the probability of becoming top-ranked
also maximizes the investors’ posterior belief of his ability (given that he wins). In this sense, my model
is related to Trueman (1988) who argues that managers choose investment strategies in order to maximize
investors’ posterior beliefs about abilities.
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a talented fund manager expects to receive a larger payment for future fund management
than a manager with less talent. This is because e.g. information rent (in a principal-agent
framework) increases or talented fund managers charge higher prices because they have more
market power (see Heinkel and Stoughton (1994)). It will later become apparent that if the
benefits of being top-ranked are independent of talent, my main results are still valid.
Notice that the substance of my results would prevail if there were more than one winner,
as long as the number of winners is small compared with the number of competing managers.
Each fund manager would consider the probability of becoming one of the winners and still
have incentives to choose ineﬃciently risky investment strategies.14
3 Competition and noise trade
In this section, I study how the level of competition in the fund management industry may
influence managers’ use of private investment signals and, consequently, the performance of
the funds. Since fixed-fee contracts are frequently used in the mutual fund industry, I use the
case with fixed-fee contracts as a benchmark (see Section 3.1 below) to discuss of the case in
which incentive contracts (explicit incentives) are provided (Section 3.2). The extensive use of
fixed-fee contracts has lead Admati and Pfleiderer (1997) and Heinkel and Stoughton (1994)
to suggest that tournament models may be useful for studying competition and performance
in the fund management industry.
3.1 Benchmark: tournament competition
Fund managers’ investment strategies depend on the informed investment available, θ. Denote
manager i’s investment strategy Ii (θ) and let Ii (θ) = 1 and Ii (θ) = 0 represent the cases
where a manager makes an informed and a noise trade, respectively.
In the tournament case, each fund manager chooses the investment strategy that maxi-
mizes the likelihood of his becoming top ranked
Max
Ii(θ)
Pr
¡
Ii, I−i, θ
¢
, (1)
where Pr
¡
Ii, I−i, θ
¢
denotes fund manager i0s probability of being top-ranked given that the
others follow investment strategy I−i.
Definition 1 Define Hz (r)as the probability distribution over rate of return, r, of a random
14However, if, contrary to shown in empirical papers (e.g. Sirri and Tufano (1998)), a majority of the funds
receives significant inflow while a small minority receives no inflow or even an outflow of capital, fund managers
would choose ineﬃciently low risk strategies in order to avoid becoming one of the losers.
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fund manager (unknown θ) following strategy
Iz(θ) =
(
0
1
if θ < z;
if θ ≥ z, (2)
where z ∈ [0, 1].
Distribution Hz (r) can be expressed using G(·) and F (·).
Hz (r) =
(
F (z)
R r
0 g (x) dx
F (z)G (z) +
R r
z (F (z) g (x) + f (x)) dx
if r ∈ [0, z] ;
if r ∈ [z, 1] .
(3)
Note that a low rate of return r ∈ [0, z] is achieved if the fund manager has a poor informed
investment opportunity (the probability of obtaining poor information is F (z)) and makes a
noise trade (the outcome of a noise trade is given by density function g (x)). This explains the
first line in equation (3). A high rate of return r ∈ [z, 1] is achieved if a fund manager either
makes a noise trade and obtains a lucky outcome or makes a superior informed trade. The
probability of obtaining r ≥ z by making a lucky noise trade is F (z) g (x). The probability
of obtaining r ≥ z by making a superior informed trade is f (x).15 This explains the second
line in equation (3).
Using the assumption that G(·) and F (·) are uniform on [0, 1], I have
Hz (r) =
(
zr
(1 + z) r − z
if r ∈ [0, z] ;
if r ∈ [z, 1] .
(4)
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium strategy)
Fund managers have a unique symmetric equilibrium strategy I
z=bθ(θ), where bθ is defined such
that the probability of winning with a noise trade equals the probability of winning with an
informed trade: Z 1
0
¡
H
z=bθ (r)¢n−1 dr = ³Hz=bθ ³bθ´´n−1 . (5)
Proof. See Appendix.
The basic argument is straightforward. If a fund manager has information about an
informed investment opportunity yielding r = bθ, he would be indiﬀerent between making an
15Note that given r ≥ z (which happens with probability 1−F (z)) the density function is f (r) / (1− F (z)).
Consequently, the probability of obtaining r ≥ z by an informed trade is
(1− F (z)) f (r)
1− F (z) = f (r) .
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informed trade and a noise trade. The probability of becoming top ranked by making an
informed trade (given by the right-hand side of equation (5)) is the same as if he makes a
noise trade (given by the left-hand side of equation (5)). A better informed trade opportunity,
θ > bθ, would induce the fund manager to make an informed trade, since this provides the
best probability of his becoming top ranked. Poorer informed trade opportunities, θ < bθ,
induce him to make a noise trade. Note that the cut-oﬀ, bθ, can be interpreted as the expected
share of fund managers making noise trades.
A fund manager’s expected performance, re
³bθ´, depends on the extent to which he makes
informed trades instead of noise trades (bθ),
re
³bθ´ = Z 1
0
xdH
z=bθ (x) = 12
³
1 + bθ − bθ2´ . (6)
From equation (6) it follows that a manager’s expected rate of return is maximized if bθ = 12 .
If the informed trade yields a lower return than 12 , the expected return from noise trade would
exceed the one from the informed trade.16
In a competitive mutual fund industry, fund managers anticipate that a relatively high
rate of return is needed to become a top performer. An informed trade with a certain
rate of return slightly above 12 yields a smaller probability of the manager becoming a top
performer than a noise trade with larger probabilities for very high and very low outcomes.
Consequently, in order to increase their probability of becoming the top performer, fund
managers choose bθ above 12 (the cut-oﬀ which maximizes the rate of return).
As the fund industry becomes more competitive (larger n) the expected rate of return
of the top performer increases and the share of managers making informed trades decreases.
Hence, fiercer competition decreases the expected rate of return from fund management.
Proposition 2 (Tournament competition)
a) More competition:
dbθ
dn
> 0 and
dre
³bθ´
dn
< 0.
b) Perfect competition:
lim
n→∞
bθ = 1,
and re
³bθ´ decreases asymptotically towards the expected rate of return from a noise trade.
Proof. See Appendix.
The relationship between the level of competition and the share of fund managers making
noise trades is illustrated in Figure 3 (see the graph denoted B = 0).
16Recall that the rate of return from a noise trade is assumed to be uniform on [0, 1].
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3.2 Incentive-fee contracts
Consider the case in which investors oﬀer incentive contracts, w(r), in order to maximize
expected net return on their investment, K,
Max
w(r)
E [K · (1 + r (I, θ))−w (r)] , (7)
subject to the fund managers’ maximization problem,
Max
Ii(θ)
E
£
w
¡
r
¡
Ii, θ
¢¢¤
+Pr
¡
Ii, I−i, θ
¢ · S · θ, (8)
and the two restrictions on feasible contracts,
w(r) ≥ 0,
and
w0(r) ≥ 0.
A fund manager chooses the investment strategy I i (θ) that maximizes the expected payment
from the investor (explicit incentives) plus the expected benefits of becoming a top performer
(implicit incentives). The rate of return achieved, r
¡
Ii, θ
¢
, depends on the fund manager’s
investment strategy, I i, and the informed trade, θ, available.
Proposition 3 shows that investors’ optimal contract is a simple bonus contract. Only
fund managers achieving a rate of return above the cut-oﬀ, bθ, (equation (10)) are rewarded
with a bonus B. The bonus B and the cut-oﬀ bθ depend on the size of the investment K.
Proposition 3 i) The optimal contract type is a bonus contract,
wbθ (r) =
(
0
B
if r < bθ;
if r ≥ bθ, (9)
and
ii) the fund managers’ investment strategy is given by Ibθ (θ) where bθ is defined by the fund
managers’ incentive constraint,
S · bθ Z 1
0
¡
H
z=bθ (r)¢n−1 dr + ³1− bθ´ ·B = S · bθ · ³Hz=bθ ³bθ´´n−1 +B. (10)
Proof. See Appendix.
The incentive constraint (10) extends the incentive constraint in the tournament case (see
equation (5)) to a setting with optimal provision of explicit incentives. If there are no explicit
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incentives (B = 0), incentive constraint (10) and (5) would be identical.
The cut-oﬀ, bθ, and bonus, B, are set such that all fund managers having better investment
opportunities than the cut-oﬀ are induced to make informed trades. Note that as the rate
of return from the informed trade increases (i.e. θ increases) the implicit incentive to make
an informed trade instead of a noise trade strengthens. It is more diﬃcult to induce fund
managers with low θ than high θ to make informed trades. Hence, investors oﬀer a fixed
bonus for all performance levels above the cut-oﬀ bθ (the bonus payment cannot decrease as
the performance rises).
The left-hand side of incentive constraint (10) represents the total expected benefits to a
manager of making a noise trade. Similarly, the right-hand side represents the total expected
benefits of making an informed trade (provided that the rate of return on an informed trade
is bθ). The first items on both sides relate to the implicit incentives and have the same
interpretation as in the tournament case (Proposition 1). The second items relate to the
explicit incentives. On the left-hand side,
³
1− bθ´B is the expected bonus payment for
making a noise trade.17 On the right-hand side, a fund manager that makes an informed
trade (given θ = bθ) is certain to obtain bonus B.
The investor’s profit-maximizing problem (see equation (7)) can now be simplified to,
Max K ·
µ
1 +
1
2
³
1 + bθ − bθ2´¶− ³1− bθ2´ ·B, (11)
subject to the incentive constraint (equation (10)).18 To obtain (11), I have used equation
(6) and that,
E [w (r)] =
³
1−H
z=bθ
³bθ´´ ·B = ³1− bθ2´ ·B. (12)
The investor’s profit-maximizing choice of bonus, B∗, and cut-oﬀ, bθ(B∗), is given by the
fund manager’s incentive constraint (10) and the investor’s first order condition,
K ·
µ
1
2
− bθ + 2 ·B · bθ¶ · ∂bθ
∂B
−
³
1− bθ2´ = 0. (13)
Note that ∂
bθ
∂B is given by implicit derivation of the fund manager’s incentive constraint (equa-
tion (10)). By increasing the bonus, it becomes more likely that a fund manager makes in-
formed trades (bθ decreases). Hence, the expected rate of return improves. However, such an
increase in the bonus payment becomes decreasingly profitable because further decreases in bθ
17Since a noise trade yields a rate of return that is assumed to be uniformly distributed on [0, 1], 1 − bθ is
the probability of obtaining r ≥ bθ.
18Note that the incentive constraint (10) describes the relationship between the cut-oﬀ for bonus payments,bθ, and the size of the bonus, B, which induces all fund managers with θ ≥ bθ to make informed trades.
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improve re at a decreasing rate (see equation (6)).19 On the other hand, the expected bonus
payment increases due both to larger bonus payments to each eligible fund manager and to
the increased likelihood that a fund manager will obtain the bonus.
The size of the investor’s investment, K, determines the strength of the profit-maximizing
explicit incentives (the size of bonus payments, B). An increase in K induces the investors
to provide stronger explicit incentives and thereby obtain a higher expected rate of return on
a larger investment.
In a setting in which many investors use the same fund manager, an increase in K could
be interpreted as improved coordination among the investors in incentive provision (less
free-riding in the incentive provision). If investors have a more eﬃcient agreement about
how to share the incentive payment to the fund managers, they will provide stronger explicit
incentives in order to increase the expected rate of return from their common fund investment.
From the fund managers’ incentive constraint (10), it follows that a strengthening of the
implicit incentives (e.g. due to a larger inflow of new investments) has a harmful eﬀect on
fund managers’ use of private investment signals.
Corollary 1 Stronger implicit incentives make the fund manager more inclined to make a
noise trade,
dbθ (B∗)
dS
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Stronger implicit incentives make it more attractive for fund managers to choose the invest-
ment opportunity with the highest probability of becoming top ranked and less attractive for
maximizing expected rate of return.
In contrast to the pure tournament case, the relationship between the level of competition
and expected performance becomes non-monotone when investors provide incentive contracts.
See Figure 2.20
Proposition 4 (More competition)
a) There exists a unique number of rivaling fund managers, n, such that,
if n ≤ n, then d
bθ (B∗)
dn
≥ 0 and dr
e
dn
≤ 0,
if n ≥ n, then d
bθ (B∗)
dn
≤ 0 and dr
e
dn
≥ 0.
19Hence straightforward calculations show that the second order condition of the investor’s profit-
maximization problem is satisfied.
20Figures 2 and 3 are generated using Maple V programs that can be obtained from the author. In Figure
3, the non-monotone graph represents the case where S = 10 and B∗ = 14 (for each n there exists a K that
makes B = 14 optimal).
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b) n decreases if the relative importance of the explicit incentives increases,
dn
d
¡
B
S
¢ < 0.
c) Perfect competition, n→∞: The fund managers use all private information signals that
increase expected performance, re (implies bθ = 12 ).
Proof. See Appendix.
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Figure 2: Competition and noise trading.
If there are few fund managers initially, n ≤ n, each fund manager has a relatively large
probability of becoming top-ranked. Consequently, the probability of becoming top-ranked
is important for the choice between an informed and a noise trade. As the number of rivals
increases, the fund managers anticipate that a higher rate of return is needed to win and
they become inclined to choose investments with ”thick-tailed” probability distributions (bθ
increases). The competition for ”tomorrow’s” investors may induce fund managers to be
more inclined to make noise trades and hence ”today’s” expected return decreases.
On the other hand, if there is fierce competition in the fund business initially, n ≥ n,
a further increase in the number of rivals makes it very diﬃcult for a manager to become
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top-ranked, and, hence, the fund managers become more inclined to choose the investment
strategy that provides the highest probability of obtaining the bonus. Hence, the share of
fund managers making noise trades decreases as the level of competition increases.
In the case of perfect competition (n → ∞), becoming a top-ranked fund manager is a
zero-probability event and only the explicit incentives direct the fund managers’ investment
strategies. By oﬀering an infinitely small bonus for performance above the expected outcome
of noise trade, investors can induce fund managers to maximize the expected rate of return.
The terms ”fixed fees” and ”incentive fees” are somewhat misleading. Fixed fees also
provide incentives to mutual fund managers to maximize the expected rate of return because
they are paid at the end of each period, which implies that a fund manager earns a portion
of the initial investment and of the return over the period. From a multi-period perspective,
fixed-fee contracts may provide fund managers with considerable incentives to maximize the
expected rate of return, because superior returns compound (assuming returns are not paid
out to investors) investments and fixed fees grow. Consequently, the non-monotonicity shown
by Proposition 4 can arise even if ”fixed-fee” contracts are used.
4 Selection eﬃciency
In this section, I study (stage-3) investors’ search for talented fund managers. As above,
I use the tournament (fixed-fee) case as a benchmark (Section 4.1) to discuss the case in
which incentive contracts are provided (Section 4.2). New investors use past performance
to identify talented managers for future fund management. In my setting, investors use
information about a fund manager’s performance at stage 2 and Bayes rule to update their
beliefs about the talent of the manager.
Investors anticipate that only some investment signals are applied at stage 2. More
precisely, there is a cut-oﬀ, bθ, separating the fund managers making an informed trade (θ ≥ bθ)
and those making a noise trade (θ < bθ) (Proposition 1 and Proposition 3). The expected
talent of a fund manager making a noise trade is 12
bθ since F (θ) is uniform. Hence all fund
managers achieving r < bθ are expected to be of type 12bθ. On the other hand, fund managers
achieving r ≥ bθ could either have obtained a lucky outcome from a noise trade or made
an informed trade. Conditional on r ≥ bθ, the probability distribution of θ for a given fund
manager is
for θ0 ≤ bθ : Pr³θ0 < bθ | r ≥ bθ´ = Pr
³
θ0 < bθ ∧ r ≥ bθ´
Pr
³
r ≥ bθ´ =
θ0
³
1− bθ´³
1− bθ´³1 + bθ´ = θ
0
1 + bθ
(14)
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and
Pr
³
θ0 ≥ bθ | r ≥ bθ´ = Pr³θ0 = r | r ≥ bθ´ = 1
1 + bθ . (15)
Since the probability that a fund manager’s rate of return reflects his talent is constant for all
r > bθ, the expected talent of the top performer exceeds all other fund managers. Proposition
5 sums up this result.21
Proposition 5 A fund manager’s expected talent is weakly increasing with his rate of return.
Consequently, the empirical tendency to ”flock” to the top performing fund is consistent
with Bayesian updating of beliefs about fund managers’ talent.
Let β denote the expected talent of the top performer. If all fund managers made noise
trades (bθ = 1), β would be the same as the average talent of the pool of competing managers.
On the other hand, if all fund managers made informed trades (bθ = 0), the best fund manager
would always be identified.22
Generally, selection eﬃciency, β, depends on the extent to which fund managers make
informed trades (bθ) and the number of rivals (n). Given that the expected talent of a fund
manager obtaining r < bθ is 12bθ, and that a fund manager with r ≥ bθ either has talent 12bθ (an
untalented manager with a lucky outcome) or r = θ (an informed trade), we can calculate
the expected talent of the top-performer,
β
³bθ, n´ = Z bθ
0
1
2
bθd ¡H
z=bθ(x)¢n + Z 1bθ
Ã
x
1
1 + bθ + 12bθ bθ1 + bθ
!
d
¡
H
z=bθ(x)¢n
=
Z bθ
0
1
2
bθnbθ(xbθ)n−1dx
+
Z 1
bθ
Ã
x
1
1 + bθ + 12bθ bθ1 + bθ
!
n(1 + bθ)((1 + bθ)x− bθ)n−1dx
=
bθ2 − bθ2n+1
2
³
1 + bθ´ + (1 + n)
bθ + n+ bθ2n+2
(1 + n)
³
1 + bθ´2 . (16)
To obtain equation (16), I have used equation (15) and (14) and the definition ofHz (equation
21Proposition 5 is consistent with Gruber (1996) who examines the performance of some 270 U.S. open-end
equity funds over a 10-year period and finds that past performance is related to future performance, and that
”sophisticated” investors moving into those funds that have performed well in the past also do well in the
future.
22This follows from the simplifying assumption that all informed trades have sure rates of return. However,
one might expect, more generally, that it will be easier to identify highly skilled fund managers when more
managers make informed trades.
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(4)).
Current investors are assumed to ignore how their incentive contracts influence later
investors’ (”stage-3 investors”) search for a talented fund manager. If I had instead assumed
that current and later investors were identical, my main results would still prevail. Each
individual investor would not take into account that by altering the incentive contract oﬀered
to his fund manager he might improve all investors’ search for a talented fund manager at
stage 3. Selection eﬃciency is a public good.
From the point of view of social eﬃciency, it is important that the best investment projects
are identified and funded. Consequently, social eﬃciency depends on fund managers’ abilities
or talent for identifying good investment projects. In Section 4.1 and Section 4.2, I analyze
how selection eﬃciency is related to the level of competition in the industry and the strength
of the explicit incentives. I show that the short-term eﬀect of more competition and stronger
explicit incentives may be the converse of the long-term eﬀect. This is due to the fact that,
in the short-term, it is important to induce a given fund manager to apply investment signals
eﬃciently, while in the long-term it is more important to identify talented managers for future
fund management.
4.1 Benchmark: Selection and tournament competition
The level of competition in a tournament is decisive for the information content of past
performance. Although fiercer competition may induce more fund managers to make noise
trades and thereby reduce current performance, Proposition 6 shows that a more competitive
industry may improve selection eﬃciency and thereby prospective performance.23
Proposition 6 Selection eﬃciency improves if the mutual fund industry becomes more com-
petitive (∆n > 0),
dβ
dn
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
It is not obvious that more competition should lead to a more talented winner. Although
a larger number of rivals implies that the expected talent of the best manager improves, it
also implies that fewer managers are using their investment signals (Proposition 2). The last
eﬀect may harm the search for talented fund managers. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship
between the expected talent of the top performer and the level of competition.24
23Note that the diﬀerence between the expected talent of the best manager (highest θ) and the expected
talent of the top performer (highest r) may increase with r. From this point of view, selection eﬃciency may
deteriorate with an increase in n.
24 In Figure 3, it is taken into account that an increase in n changes bθ according to the incentive constraint
(equation (10)).
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The net eﬀect of fiercer competition on social eﬃciency is ambiguous. Selection eﬃciency
improves, but current performance deteriorates.
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Figure 3: Expected talent of the top performer in the tournament case.
4.2 Selection and performance-fee contracts
Investors oﬀer performance-fee contracts to improve current fund management performance.
Performance-fee contracts induce fund managers to use private investment signals more eﬃ-
ciently and thereby increase the expected rate of return. Surprisingly, Proposition 7 shows
that better use of talent and private investment signals in current fund management may make
it more diﬃcult for later investors to use past performance to identify talented managers.25
Proposition 7 Stronger explicit incentives (due, e.g. to larger current investments, K) have
an ambiguous eﬀect on selection eﬃciency,
dβ
dB
≷ 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
To see the reasoning behind this result, first consider the case without a performance
fee (B = 0). The fund managers’ investment strategies are solely driven by the (implicit)
25 In a richer model with many investors using the same fund manager, an increase in K has the same
consequences as if investors became more able to share the cost of incentive provision eﬃciently (less free-
riding).
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incentives to become top-ranked. The introduction of an incentive contract induces some
fund managers to switch from noise to informed trades. These fund managers reduce their
probability of becoming top-ranked but increase their expected payment today (the bonus).
Consequently, the probability of one of the rival fund managers becoming top-ranked in-
creases. The impact on selection eﬃciency depends on whether it is the more or the less
talented fund managers which improve their win probability most. If less talented man-
agers increase their win probability significantly, selection eﬃciency deteriorates. On the
other hand, if more talented managers increase their win probability significantly, selection
eﬃciency improves. Hence, stronger explicit incentives have ambiguous eﬀects on selection
eﬃciency. See Figure 4.26
The intuition for the non-monotonicity result can also be seen by observing that for a
given r > θ the expected talent,
E
³
θ | r > bθ´ = 1
2
bθ bθ
1 + bθ + r 11 + bθ =
1
2
bθ2 + r
1 + bθ ,
is non-monotone in the cut-oﬀ bθ. Hence, if we keep the expected performance of the top
performer, rmax, constant when we introduce a bonus payment (B) and, thereby, reduce bθ,
the expected talent of the top performer may decrease. Note, however, that this cannot serve
as a proof of Proposition 7 since rmax changes as bθ changes. But for large n, rmax will be
close to 1 and a change in bθ will only induce a small change in rmax and hence the argument
above is approximately correct.
26The end points of the graphs plotted in Figure 4 are given by bθ(n,B = 0). Introduction of a performance
fee reduces bθ.
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Figure 4: Expected talent of the top performer.
The following example shows that the tournament competition of the type commonly
observed in the mutual fund industry might be socially desirable although it deteriorates
short-term performance.
Example: Competition and selection eﬃciency with and without incentive-fee contracts.
Let K = 10, S = 7, and n = 30.
The tournament case: It follows from numeric solution of the fund manager’s incentive com-
patibility condition (equation (10)) that bθ = 0.93. From equation (16) we have β = 0.73.
The incentive-fee case: It follows from numeric solution of the investor’s profit-maximization
problem (Proposition 2) that bθ∗ = 0.70 and B∗ = 0.14. From equation (16) we have β = 0.72.
A comparison of social eﬃciency in the two cases depends on the importance of selection
eﬃciency. Selection eﬃciency is best in the tournament case, but expected rate of return is
highest in the incentive-fee case.
5 Empirical implications
There are several interesting empirical questions raised by the above analysis.
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First, the model points out (Proposition 4 and Corollary 1) the importance of competition
and inflow of investments for mutual fund managers’ investment strategies. The theoretical
analysis indicates that competition for new investments can induce a fund manager to take
noise trades, and, consequently, reduce the fund managers’ average performance. According
to Proposition 4, this tendency to choose noise trade depends on the number of competing
fund managers and is most pronounced with an intermediate level of competition. This
could, for example, be investigated by comparing fund managers in diﬀerent industries or
countries. Another setting for investigating this would be to compare internal and external
fund managers. Since internal fund managers do not compete for investments from outside
investors, they may face weaker implicit incentives and, according to my model, choose better
investment strategies than outside managers. Hard evidence on the relative performance of
internal versus outside fund managers is sparse. Exceptions include a survey among eight
hundred corporate and two hundred and fifty public pension plan sponsors in the United
States published in Institutional Investor (”In-house afire”, April 1996). This survey shows
that internally managed funds outperformed those run by outside managers. A report from
OECD also points out the same feature for the UK: ”Data for the United Kingdom also seem
to confirm that the average returns are lowest for external fund managers” (The Impact of
institutional investors on OECD financial markets, Financial Market Trends, November 1997,
p. 30).
Second, in Section 3 I showed that performance-fee contracts can be used to counteract
implicit incentives due to managers’ competition for new investments. Since strong implicit
incentives lead to a high level of noise trades, investors can oﬀer performance-fee contracts
to reduce the level of noise trade. This could be investigated by studying the empirical
relationship between inflow of investment and use of performance-fee contracts.27
Third, the model points out that large inflow of investment lead to more noise trade,
and, consequently, less performance persistence. There is some empirical evidence consistent
with such a relationship. Empirical studies (e.g. Daniel et al. (1997) and Malkiel (1995))
have shown that it is more diﬃcult to discover persistent superior performance in the last
two decades than in previous decades. This, together with the fact that the US mutual fund
business has experienced an average yearly growth in excess of 20% the last decades, indicates
that weak performance persistence might be an eﬀect of a large inflow of investments.
27 It should be taken into account that the level of competition, i.e. the number of fund managers, influences
the strength of the implicit incentives (Proposition 4).
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6 Market eﬃciency and public policy
Fee structure: In some countries, the legal and regulatory structure has placed constraints
on how fund managers are paid. For instance, permissible fee structures in the United States
mutual fund industry are laid out in the 1970 Amendment to the Investment Company Act
of 1940. The regulation allows mutual funds and their investment advisers to enter into
performance-based compensation contracts only if they are of the ”fulcrum” variety.28 The
fee must be symmetric around a chosen benchmark or index, decreasing for underperforming
the benchmark in the same way as it increases for outperforming it. It has been claimed that
this regulation is misdirected. For instance, Baumol et al. (1990) suggest the elimination of
all regulation of fee structures in the mutual fund industry because ”such pricing rules often
induce the imposition of prices other than those that the forces of competition would have
yielded. Consequently, the resulting industry prices will not be those that serve the public
interest” (see also Das and Sundaram (1998)). I have shown that competition among funds
does not necessarily lead to an eﬃcient outcome. Current investors do not pay suﬃcient
attention to selection eﬃciency (which can be considered a public good) when incentive fees
are set. Investors may choose fee structures which impede late investors’ search for talented
fund managers. Although is an open question whether government regulation can improve
selection eﬃciency, questions regarding selection eﬃciency should not be ignored.
Switching costs: Costs associated with changing investment funds can impede competi-
tion. Examples of switching costs include possible capital tax liability due to changing of
funds, low fund share liquidity, sales load and redemption fees. These switching costs were
quite high at the time of the enactment of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and a com-
mon fear that investment funds may abuse market power motivated the regulation of the
fee structure. The widespread reduction in switching costs in the last decades suggests that
fee regulation should be revised or removed. However, I have shown that switching costs,
which serve as an imperfect commitment to using the current fund manager in the future,
can improve (short-term) fund performance.29 Furthermore, my analysis shed some light on
investors’ growing demand for removal of fee regulation. Fee regulation impedes the use of
powerful incentive contracts which can counteract the harmful eﬀects of increasingly powerful
implicit incentives on fund management. It is commonly claimed that competition removes
28A 1972 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) study shows that performance-based compensation
contracts were becoming common before 1970. In 1968 and 1969, roughly 40 percent of all new funds used
performance fees. After the 1970 Amendment to the Investment Company Act of 1940 the use of performance
fees were significantly reduced. By 1972, performance fees were used in only 10 percent of funds.
29 Investors might be better oﬀ if they committed not to flock to the top performer. This would reduce the
implicit incentives and improve fund management. However, as shown by Proposition 5 it is ex post optimal
to use the last period’s top-performer. Consequently, it might be diﬃcult for the investors to commit credibly
to using an inferior fund manager at a later stage.
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the need to use explicit contracts. Baumol et al. (1990), for instance, argue that ”explicit
contracts are likely to be unnecessary to enforce transaction in markets that are highly com-
petitive because, with low transaction costs, market forces can be depended on to provide
the necessary discipline.”30 I show that competition is not a good substitute for contracts.
From a social eﬃciency perspective, the net benefit of a decrease in the switching costs
depends on whether the long-term benefit of directing a larger share of total investments to
the fund manager expected to be best, exceeds the cost of reduced current fund performance
due to stronger implicit incentives.
7 Concluding remarks
Competition as well as contracts influences fund managers’ choice of investment strategy. I
show that competition for new investors creates implicit incentives which may result in an
ineﬃcient use of managers’ private investment signals. On the other hand, explicit incentives
provided by contracts is shown to counteract harmful implicit incentives and improve the
fund managers’ performance. The interaction of implicit and explicit incentives results in a
non-monotone relationship between the level of competition (number of rivaling funds) and
expected performance of fund managers. An intermediate level of competition induces a less
eﬃcient use of private information than would be the case with either a high or low level
of competition. Furthermore, I show that explicit incentives provided by current investors
may impede new investors in their search for talented fund managers for prospective fund
management. Although explicit incentives improve current fund managers’ performance, it
may reduce selection eﬃciency and thereby negatively aﬀect prospective performance.
My analysis may shed some light on other settings in which implicit and explicit incentives
interact. In organizations, workers often face both explicit incentives provided by employment
contracts as well as implicit incentives associated with their career concerns.31 Similarly to
the discussion in my paper, Gibbons and Murphy (1992), argue that the principal — the
investor in my case — has to pay attention to total incentives; the combination of implicit and
explicit incentives. The focus in this branch of the literature has been on the workers’ choice
of eﬀort, not choice of project or task. However, if workers are delegated the authority to
choose among tasks or projects that diﬀer in risk and the worker obtaining the best outcome
is promoted, then the setting resembles the one discussed here.32 My analysis can provide
30Baumol et al. (1990) suggest that funds’ capacity to impose costs on investors who want to change funds
should be restricted. Such restrictions may strenghten the harmful eﬀects of implicit incentives on fund
management from.
31See the seminal papers Fama (1980) and Holmstrom (1999). Gibbons (1996) provides a recent survey of
incentive pay and careers in organizations.
32The fact that performance-fee or performance-wage contracts can harm the search for talented workers
can shed some light on the empirical evidence showing that low-power incentives commonly are used in
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insights about the link between competition for promotion, workers’ choice of tasks, incentive
pay, and the expected talent of the promoted worker.
Apart from the empirical issues raised in Section 5, the analysis presented here could be
extended in several directions. A straightforward extension of the model presented would
involve studying the impact of implicit and explicit incentives on managers’ eﬀorts to gather
information. One would expect that fund managers who seldom make informed trades would
have weak incentives to spend resources on acquiring information. Consequently, investors
will suﬀer both from ineﬃcient use of information as well as ineﬃcient incentives to acquire
information. A more demanding extension of the model would be to assume that although
managers slowly learn about their talents, they have some private information about their
talent which they can signal to investors through their choice of contract.
organizations (see e.g. Jensen and Murphy (1990)).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Using the definition of Hz (equation (4)) it follows that
Z 1
0
¡
H
z=bθ (x)¢n−1 dx = Z bθ
0
³bθx´n−1 dx+ Z 1bθ
³
x
³
1 + bθ´− bθ´n−1 dx
=
1
n
bθ2n−1 + 1− bθ2n³
1 + bθ´n
and ³
H
z=bθ
³bθ´´n−1 = bθ2n−2.
Hence, equation (5) can be simplified to
1
n
bθ2n−1 + 1− bθ2n³
1 + bθ´n = bθ2n−2 (17)
Note that equation (17) has a unique solution, bθ: Define k(bθ) ≡ n³bθ2n + bθ2n−1´and l(bθ) ≡bθ ³1 + bθ2n´. Note that k(bθ)− l(bθ) = 0 is identical to equation (17). Since k(0) ≤ l (0) , k(1) >
l (1), kbθ(bθ), lbθ(bθ) > 0 and lbθbθ(bθ) < kbθbθ(bθ), it follows that k(bθ) and l(bθ) intersect only once.
Hence bθ is unique.
Furthermore, since an increase in θ improves the win probability resulting from choosing
an informed trade while keeping the win probability resulting from choosing a noise trade
constant, only fund managers of type θ > bθ make an informed trade. Ibθ (θ) is a unique
symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Part a): Define
Φ0 ≡ (1− n)bθ2n−1 + 1− nbθ2n−2
Note that equation (5) (see also equation (17)) is identical to Φ0 = 0. From implicit diﬀer-
entiation of the fund manager’s incentive constraint it follows that:
dbθ
dn
= −Φ
0
n
Φ0bθ
Straightforward calculations show that Φ0bθ < 0. Hence sign
³
dbθ
dn
´
= sign
¡
Φ0n
¢
. First note
that
Φ0n =
bθ2n−2 ³2bθ lnbθ − bθ − 2bθn lnbθ − 1− 2n lnbθ´ = 0
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if n = n0:
n0 = −
bθ + 1− 2bθ2 lnbθ
2
³
1 + bθ´ lnbθ .
However, since θ satisfying Φ0 (n0, θ) = 0 is not in [0, 1], Φ0n cannot change sign. It is now
suﬃcient to show that Φ0n > 0 for one feasible (n,bθ)-pair (that satisfies equation (17)): E.g.³
n = 3,bθ = 0.69´ implies Φ0n = 0.35 > 0. For the proof of Proposition 4 it is useful to note
that Φ0n is monotonically decreasing in n and limn→∞Φ0n = 0.
Part b) follows from the fact that the expected rate of return of the top performer ap-
proaches 1 as n→∞. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3 (sketch of the proof): First, note that the implicit incentives
inducing the fund manager to choose an informed trade increase with an increase in θ (see
the proof of Proposition 1). Second, note that the implicit benefits to investors of choosing
an informed trade instead of a noise trade increase with an increase in θ (see equation (6))
Consequently, an increase in θ implies that weaker or no explicit incentives are required to
induce the fund manager to choose the informed trade opportunity. It follows that an investor
will not induce a fund manager with high θ to make a noise trade while a fund manager with
low θ is induced to make an informed trade (in fact, it is impossible to induce such behavior
given that w0 (r) ≥ 0). Hence, the investors’ optimal provision of explicit incentives induces
the fund managers to follow a strategy of type Iz (see equation (2)).
By paying no bonus to fund managers achieving r < z (these managers have definitely
made noise trades) and by paying a positive bonus to fund managers achieving r ≥ z (these
managers may have made informed trades) investors maximize a ”θ = z-fund manager’s”
expected diﬀerence in payment due to their making an informed trade instead of a noise
trade. Because the implicit incentives for making an informed trade increase with an increase
in θ, the bonus should be constant for ∀r ∈ [z, 1] (recall that payment is required for an
increase in performance, w0 (r) ≥ 0). Such an incentive contract is described by equation (9).
For a given B, z = bθ, defined by incentive constraint (10), is the smallest feasible z which
induces managers with θ ≥ z = bθ to make informed trades and managers with θ < z = bθ to
make noise trades. A manager of type bθ is indiﬀerent with respect to making an informed
or a noise trade. Hence equation (9) and the incentive constraint (10) describe the optimal
incentive contract. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1:Define
Φ ≡ S
 1
n
bθ2n−1 + 1− bθ2n³
1 + bθ´n
− ³bθ2n−2´
−B∗ (18)
Note that the fund manager’s incentive constraint (10) is identical to Φ = 0 (see also equation
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(17) and equation (10)). From implicit derivation it follows that
dbθ
dS
= −ΦS
Φbθ
Note that according to the envelope theorem, the optimal bonus payment (B∗) does not
change (no first-order eﬀect) as a result of marginal change in one of the parameters (e.g. S).
Straightforward calculations show that Φbθ < 0 and ΦS > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Part a): From implicit diﬀerentiation of equation (18) it follows
that
dbθ
dn
= −Φn
Φbθ .
Straightforward calculations show that Φbθ < 0 (as before).
Note that equation (10) can be written as
Φ+ ≡ Φ0 −
³
1 + bθ´nB
S
= 0
As before Φ+bθ < 0 and sign
³
dbθ
dn
´
= sign (Φ+n ).
Φ+n = Φ
0
n −
³
1 + bθ´ B
S
Since Φ0n is monotonically decreasing in n and limn→∞Φ0n = 0 (see the proof of Proposition
2) and Φ0n > 0, we can conclude that there exists a unique n such that Φ
+
n > 0 for n < n and
Φ+n < 0 for n > n. From equation (6), it follows that
dre
dbθ < 0, ∀bθ ∈ £12 , 1¤. That completes
the proof of part a).
Part b) follows from the fact that Φ+n is decreasing in
B
S .
Part c): Recall that bθ = 12 maximizes (gross) rate of return. From the fund manager’s
incentive constraint (equation (17)) BM induces the fund managers to set bθ = 12
BM = S
"
1
n
µ
1
2
¶2n−1
+
1− ¡12¢2n¡
1 +
¡
1
2
¢¢
n
−
µ
1
2
¶2n−2#
Furthermore, note that limn→∞ BM = 0. Since the cost to the investor of inducing the
fund manager to follow a profit-maximizing investment strategy (bθ = 12) approaches 0 as the
number of competing fund managers approach infinity, investors will induce bθ = 12 and hence
maximize re. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: Diﬀerentiate the incentive constraint (17) and obtain d
bθ
dn which
can be used to show that dβdn =
∂β
∂bθ dbθdn + ∂β∂n (diﬀerentiation of equation (16)) is positive as
illustrated in Figure 3. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 7: First note that bθ(B) is decreasing in B (which follows from
Corollary 1 and equation (10)). Second, two examples can be used to show that β
³bθ, n´
is non-monotone in bθ: Example 1: Suppose bθ = 0.8 and n = 20 (for diﬀerent Ks, all bθ in­
1
2 , 1
®
are feasible outcomes from an optimal incentive contract) then ∂β
∂bθ = 0.05. Example 2:
Suppose n = 20 and bθ = 0.6 then ∂β
∂bθ = −0.06. Q.E.D.
27
References
Admati, A. and Pfleiderer, P. (1990), Direct and indirect sale of information, Econometrica,
58, 901—928.
Admati, A. R. and Pfleiderer, O. (1997), Does it all ad up? Benchmarks and the compensation
of active portfolio managers, Journal of Business, 70, 323—350.
Allen, F. (1990), The market for information and the origin of financial intermediation,
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 1, 3—30.
Allen, F. and Gorton, G. (1993), Churning bubbles, Review of Economic Studies, 60, 813—836.
Ausubel, L. M. (1990), Insider trading in a rational expectations economy, American Eco-
nomic Review, 80, 1022—1041.
Baumol, W. J., Goldfeld, S. M., Gordon, L. A. and Koehn, M. F. (1990), The economics of
mutual fund markets: Competition versus Regulation, Boston: Kluwer Acadenic Publishers.
Bhattacharya, S. and Pfleiderer, P. (1985), Delegated portfolio management, Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 36, 1—25.
Biais, B. and Hillion, P. (1994), Insider and liquidity trading in stock and options markets,
Review of Financial Studies, 7, 743—780.
Black, F. (1986), Noise, Journal of Finance, 41, 529—43.
Brown, K., Harlow, W. V. and Starks, L. T. (1996), Of tournaments and temptations: An
analysis of managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry, Journal of Finance, 51,
85—110.
Chevalier, J. and Ellison, G. (1997), Risk taking by mutual funds as a response to incentives,
Journal of Political Economy, 105, 1167—1200.
Chevalier, J. and Ellison, G. (1999), Career concerns of mutual fund managers, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 114, 389—432.
Daniel, K. D., Grinblatt, M., Titman, S. and Wermers, R. (1997), Measuring mutual fund
performance with characteristic-based benchmarks, Journal of Finance, 52, 1035—58.
Das, S. R. and Sundaram, R. K. (1998), Fee speech: Adverse selection and the regulation of
mutual fund fees, Working Paper 6644, NBER, Cambridge.
De Long, J. B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L. H. and Waldmann, R. J. (1990), Noise trader risk
in financial markets, Journal of Political Economy, 98, 703—738.
28
Dimond, D. and Verrecchia, R. E. (1981), Information aggregation in a noisy rational expec-
tations economy, Journal of Financial Economics, 9, 221—235.
Dow, J. and Gorton, G. (1997), Noise trading, delegated portfolio management, and economic
welfare, Journal of Political Economy, 105, 1024—1050.
Fama, E. F. (1980), Agency problems and the theory of the firm, Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 88, 288—307.
Gibbons, R. (1996), Incentives and careers in organizations, NBER Working Paper No 5705,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Gibbons, R. and Murphy, K. J. (1992), Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career
concerns: Theory and evidence, Journal of Political Economy, 100, 468—505.
Goetzmann, W. N. and Peles, N. (1997), Cognitive Dissonance and Mutual Fund Investors,
Journal of Financial Research, 20, 145—58.
Golec, J. H. (1992), Empirical tests of a principal-agent model of the investor-investment
advisor relationship, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 27, 81—95.
Gompers, P. and Lerner, J. (1999), An analysis of compensation in the U.S. venture capital
partnership, Journal of Financial Economics, 51, 3—44.
Gruber, M. J. (1996), Another puzzle: The growth in actively managed mutual funds, Journal
of Finance, 51, 783—810.
Heinkel, R. and Stoughton, N. M. (1994), The dynamics of portfolio management contracts,
Review of Financial Studies, 7, 351—387.
Holmstrom, B. (1999), Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective, Review of
Economic Studies, 66, 169—182.
Ippolito, R. A. (1992), Consumer reaction to measures of poor quality: Evidence from the
mutual fund industry, Journal of Law and Economics, 35, 45—70.
James, D. and Isaac, R. M. (2000), Asset markets: How they are aﬀected by tournament
incentives for individuals, American Economic Review, 90, 995—1004.
Jensen, M. C. and Murphy, K. J. (1990), Performance pay and top-management incentives,
Journal of Political Economy, 98, 225—264.
Karceski, J. (2000), Return-chasing behavior, mutual funds and beta’s death, Working paper,
University of Florida, Warrington College of Business.
29
Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1992), The structure and performance of the
money managment industry, in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics,
pp. 339—391, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
Malkiel, B. G. (1995), Returns from investing in equity mutual funds 1971 to 1991, Journal
of Finance, 50, 549—72.
Roston, M. (1996), Mutual fund managers and life cycle risk: An empirical investigation,
Manuscript, Univ. Chicago, Dept. of Econ.
Sirri, E. R. and Tufano, P. (1998), Costly search and mutual fund flows, Journal of Finance,
53, 1589—1622.
Stoughton, N. (1993), Moral hazard and the portfolio management problem, Journal of Fi-
nance, 48, 2009—2028.
Trueman, B. (1988), A theory of noise trading in securities markets, Journal of Finance, 43,
83—95.
Walter, I. (1999), The global asset management industry: Competitive structure and perfor-
mance, Financial markets, Institutions, and Instruments, 8, 1—78.
30
